Addendum to donÕt soil MenelikÕs name

 

This is an addendum to the open letter asking folks not to soil the name of Emperor Menelik II.  It begins by outlining basic cultural and internal political aspects of the pertinent period, and expands on historical facts described in the open letter.

 

Addendum A describes Egyptian military expeditions to Ethiopia that resulted in making Egypt a British colony while it weakened Ethiopia. The Egyptian efforts also resulted in Ethiopia losing its coastal and maritime regions.  Egyptian military expedition to Ethiopia reached its zenith in 1875. The expeditions were so expensive for Egypt that, within half a dozen years, colonization of Egypt began with a British naval bombardment of Alexandria in1882.

 

Three intertwined interests guided Egyptian animosity toward Ethiopia.  The first is that about 80% of the Nile comes from Ethiopia, and Egypt believes that it has to have a weak Ethiopia so that it would have an uninterrupted flow from the Blue Nile. Its second rationale for animosity was based on the fact that Egypt was subservient to the Ottoman Empire, which was the self-styled protector of the Muslim faith, and which had a bogus claim on Ethiopian territory8 that it called Habeshistan. Even when Egypt sought independence from Turkey, European powers had intervened, which resulted in the Egyptian leader gaining the title Khedive (sort of prince), instead of simply being called Pasha, and becoming an owner of Egypt that paid tribute to Turkey. The third rationale for animosity with Ethiopia was economical.  With the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) the Khedive of Egypt had the economic interest of owning the African coastal territories by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopia happened to be on the African coast that Egypt wished to own forcibly, particularly since Ethiopians were disunited and allowed the Napier expedition to Maqdela, at which the Ethiopian Emperor killed himself (1868). The endless assault by Egypt against Ethiopia unity is perhaps captured by Professor Mammo MuchieÕs (Oct. 6, 2011) statement: ÒOne of my Egyptian friends took me earlier to Al Haazar University and showed me where the ELF early recruits back in 1962 met and plotted to start armed struggle against Ethiopia with full Egyptian Government backing under Gamal Abdel Nasser then. I said to the students I do not mind that you use our water, but I mind and strongly find it offensive that you plot to give us war and divide us to use the water.Ó

 

Appendix B describes the 1887 Dogali battle at which Ras Alula annihilated Italian soldiers.  Since Alula undertook the battle without seeking permission, Emperor Yohannes IV removed Alula from being a ruler of Merb Melash (a region that Italy called Eritrea in 1889). The incident also intensified the efforts of the Crispi led Italian government and the British foreign office for colonizing Ethiopian territory.

 

Appendix C described the 1895 Amba Alage battle at which Ethiopia decimated a forward Italian military force that had established a fort.  It also describes the January1896 removal of an Italian force from its fort at Mekele by Ethiopians denying it to get water.  This was before the March 1896 battle of Adwa at which about 20,000 strong Italian forces were decimated.

The Appendix ends by providing brief notes on cultural and political aspects of Ethiopia of 100-150 years ago.

 

Appendix 1. The 1875 Egyptian expeditions to Ethiopia:  How Egypt bankrupted itself

 

Preluded:

It was in1557, after the Ahmed GragnÕs Jihad that a Turkish ship landed at Arqiqo.  A couple of centuries later Ras Mikael Sehul of Tigre became a reagent. He killed the young emperor for whom he was supposed to work, and appointed another only to kill the second one too. Mikael was removed forcibly.  However, he ushered the period in which Ethiopia emperors lost central control known as the ÔZemene MesafintÓ or Era of Princes (1769-1855). During the Era of the princes the children of Yemeni Sheikh Umer, the family (were) beginning with Ras Guangul became regents for the Gonderine Emperors.  Though the family (Were Sheikh, or were sceck) became Christians several northern princes regarded them Muslims, which fueled internal wars.  Central control of histrorical Ethiopia was weakened or entirely lost, and particularly control over the southern regions.

 

In the latter part of the Era of Princes, on 16 June 1847 a Turco-Egyptian force landed at Arqiqo (also called Dehono, and located next to the island of Massawa) burnt the village and built a fort.  The invaders traded with inhabitants of Hamasen. Ras Wube was the prince governing northern Ethiopia and its coastal and maritime regions. Europeans were engaged in obfuscating the magnitude of the act by advising Ras Wube not to take military actions, but to appeal to Egypt and to Europe. The Europeans showed letters to the princes of Ethiopia that they had composed to send to foreign authorities as though their pieces of papers had any values beyond defocusing the Ethiopian princes. Ras Wube had written to Britain asking that it help constrain Turkey, and that it also send skilled English workers. The reply Wube got was negative on both requests. The foreign office wrote Wube telling him that Turkey is a friend to the British Queen too, essentially indicating that Britain no longer considered Massawa as Ethiopian territory. They also told consul Plowden to discourage Wube from ever thinking about receiving skilled workers4. Ras Wube had to send less than 3000 soldiers and drive away the Egyptian from the mainland. It is clear that serious foreign policy problems awaited the next Ethiopian leader, Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) as he tried to unify Ethiopia and protect its interests.

 

False claims by the Ottoman Empire that it owned Ethiopia were used by the Khedive of Egypt to get permission and occupy Ethiopian territory.  That is how Khedive Ismail felt he got the permission of Istanbul to acquire the Ethiopian ports of Suakin (Swakim) and Massawa in 1865. Several aliens who resided in Ethiopia worked for Egyptian and European interests and exacerbated the problem Ethiopia faced.  In the 1860-70s, Mr. Werner Munzinger, a Swiss, was perhaps the worst individual enemy that Ethiopia ever had. He served as vise-consul to Massawa for Britain, then for France, and subsequently became Egyptian governor of Massawa, who probably bought land in the Bogos before he became a pasha of Egypt.  Munzinger served the Napier expedition against Emperor Tewodros (1868) by helping build roads and gathering information from locals. The death of Emperor Tewodros had emboldened Egypt and their European advisors who wished to conquer Ethiopia.  Munzinger was eager for Egypt to take the Bogos, with Keren as its capital, and other Ethiopian territories. An expedition to Bogos by Egyptian forces met no local resistance, because European Christian missionaries and the British consul Plowden had earlier worked hard to psychologically decouple that region from Ethiopia4.  At any rate, led by American and European as well as Egyptian officers the Khedive of Egypt organized military expeditions in 1875 including the following1,2.

 

Expedition 1. From Massawa to River Mereb

Expedition 2. From Tajura to Awsa

Expedition 3. From Zeyla to Harer

 

 

 

1A. The 1875 Gundet battle: 1ST Expedition to Mereb Melash, near River Mereb

A Danish, Colonel Arendrup was hired to command a large Egyptian army to invade Ethiopia through the north.  He landed in Massawa on 26 September 1875, took about 3000 soldiers and arrived in Asmara on 16 October 1875. Another battalion of Egyptian soldiers was sent from Keren to join the invading army at Asmara.  The invading army moved south and the vanguard unit reached the Mereb on 6 November.   On 23 October Yohannes IV gave a call to arms4

 

On November 12 (2 hdar, others say Nov 15/16) 1875, Yohannes IV left his palace at 11:00 am, crossed River Mereb after three hours1. He confronted half of Arendrup soldiers whom he had left at Gundet and then marched to the Gudagude valley.  Egypt lost at both fronts.  Arendrup lay dead after a battle of 1 hour at Gudagunde.  Egyptian and Sudanese dead were 150 and three pro-Egyptian Ethiopians were captured. The remaining were killed or run away.  On the Ethiopian side at Gundet 31 died and 55 were wounded. At Gudagude 521 died and 335 were wounded1.

 

The Egyptians left behind 2,000 to 2,500 Remington rifles, 14 to 16 canons and rocket studs with ammunitions4.   Subsequently, the victorious Yohannes IV determined while at Adi Qwala not to take any further military actions against the Egyptians in the Bogos or Massawa.  Rather, he wrote letters to European leaders and sent Kirkham along with 100 Egyptian prisoners to Massawa1.4.  Kirkham was imprisoned at Massawa and died 6 months later 1.

 

 

2A.  The March 1876 Gura battle, 2nd Egyptian expedition, 5 miles south of Dekemahre

Khedive Ismail wanted to avenge the annihilation of his soldiers in the Gundit battle near River Mereb.  He organized a well-armed large army of 15,000 solders commanded by the EgyptÕs defense minster, Pasha Mohammed Ratib, with the USA General Loring in 2nd command, and IsmailÕs son as chief of staff. They arrived in Massawa and marched to the highlands.  Dejazmatch Wolde Mikael, governor of Hamasen, who likely was bribed by Munzinger, changed sides and was given the title of Ras by Pasha Ratib.  As with the Napier expedition against Emperor Tewodros, Egyptians had hoped for more defections of Ethiopia notables to their side.  However, that dream failed to materialize1.  Ratib arrived 40 miles south of Asmara and built a fort at Gura with 5000 to 6,000 armed soldiers, and a smaller one at Kayakor. The Khedive sent a letter to Menelik to inform him of the impending Egyptian punishment of Yohannes IV and requested a quick response from Menelik acknowledging the message.  Instead Menelik sent 500 to 2000 soldiers to Yohannes IV and ignored the Khedives request for a response.  On March 16 (Megabit 71, others say, March 7) 1876 the Ethiopians marched between the forts of Gura and Kayakor, forcing Ratib to engage them before they attacked the weaker fort at Kayakor. The battle raged for four hours at which Egypt lost the battle and the surviving Egyptians run to their fort at Gura1.  Ethiopians laid siege of the fort on the following two days before abandoned the effort.  During the 2 days siege Egyptians killed many Ethiopians with rocket launchers, cannons and by bullets from Remington guns. Estimates of dead and wounded vary based on who is reporting the incident.  Mr. Dou, a French who was with the Ethiopian soldiers, had according to Tekle Tsadiq (1982, E.C.), documented that on the Egyptian side a 1000 died, 1600 were wounded, 2,200 became prisoners and 400 survived and returned to the fort.   On the Ethiopian side, 5000 were killed.  Because many Ethiopians went to the places they came from taking war booties with them, after the war Yohannes IV had only 25,000 soldiers with him, while he had 50,000 soldiers before the battle.  Ethiopian victory would have been achieved with little loss on their side had it not been for the fact that they laid siege of the fort at Gura for two more days after the main battle (Rubenson, 1976).

 

The victory against Egyptians who ventured out of the fort was very sweet indeed and was shared across the land. As reported by the French traveler, Aranaux the Gura victory in the north was celebrated in Shewa for three days.  More significantly, Khedive IsmailÕs dream of colonizing Ethiopia was forcibly stopped. Yohannes IV told the Egyptians to leave the fort at Gura and from Bogos and go back home. However, since Yohannes IV did not remove all Egyptians out of Ethiopia, negotiations about the Egyptian invaders and claims went on for 7 more years.  

 

 

Expedition 2. From Tajura to Awsa

Pasha Munzinger was ordered to occupy Awsa and control the caravan routes to Welo and Shewa.  He left Tajura on 14 November 1875 and arrived in Awsa guided by the Afar. The next morning at 3:00 AM on 27 October 1875, Munzinger and 150 of his well-armed Egyptian soldiers and 500 Danakil followers were killed by a band of Afar Ethiopians.  About 73 Sudanese and 73 Egyptians survived and made it to Tajura1.  Killing Munzinger was perhaps one of the most significant contributions to the independence of Ethiopia delivered by its warriors at Awsa at that time (Rubenson, 1976).

 

Expedition 3. From Zeyla to Harer.

The Khedive had sent ships to the ports of Zeyla, and Berbera.  By July 18, 1875, Pasha Muhammad Rauf occupied Zeyla. He then advanced and occupied the walled city of Harer by early October. On the road to and at the walled city he had met local resistance but Rauf had superior armaments.  He stayed in Harer for 10 years until a British envoy sent from Aden arranged for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison by 1885.  However, Britain had already possessed the ports of Zeyla and Berbera and the rest of northern Somalia before the departure of Egyptian forces and established a British colony in Somali

 

During the ten year stay in Harer the Egyptians, which the locals called Turks, had rekindled the Moslem faith in the walled city. They also had Islamized the surrounding largely Oromo pastoralists and farmers from whom they gathered taxes.  By 1887 Menelik had re-incorporated Harerghe and placed the region on a large economic and political footing.

 

Note well: Semitic-speaking Muslim townsmen of Harer, and Semitic-speaking framer-traders amongst the largely pastoralist Oromo lived in Harerghe before and during the Egyptian expedition. The phrase Semetic speakers is used here not to slight the Cushitic speakers.  Rather it is to counter the surprise that some alien historian allude to as they recount that Semitic speaker had lived southeast of the Main Ethiopian rift valley.  Otherwise, whatever the language spoken, we are dealing with Ethiopians. The Shewan Solomonic Emperors had ruled regions including Bale, Harerghe and coastal regions.  In a victory song of the soldiers of one of the emperors the name Somalia was given to the coastal region by the Gulf of Zeyla (now Gulf of Aden). The Jihad by Ahmed Gragn had devastated Christians and Churches. The Jihad happened in the reign of Libne Dingle. In the wake of Ahmed GragnÕs Jihad the northward migration of the Oromo (Gala) happened, and perhaps it was due in response to population explosion.   At any rate, Ethiopian emperors before the Jihad by Ahmed Gragn ruled the region, for example, the local inhabitants were paying tributes to Libne Dengl (1507-1540), and again after the Jihad by Gragn to Zerse Dengl (1563-1597). Clearly, the region is part of historical Ethiopia. However, Harer was decoupled from direct rule by Ethiopian emperor during the period known as ÒZemene MesafintÓ  (1769-1855).

 

Reunification of Ethiopia began by Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) in the north. Subsequently, Yohannes IV and Menelik II had pursued the same goal as Tewodros.  However, Menelik II had not yet re-incorporated Harer by 1875 when RaufÕs military expedition to Zeyla and Harer had began.  Hararghe was incorporated in 1887, after Britain, which had colonized Egypt in 1882, had already colonized what it called Northern Somalia including the ports of Zeyla and Berbera, and had caused the Egyptians to depart from Harer in 1885.

 

 

 

 

Appendix B.

 

The January 27, 1887 Dogali incident of Italian military expedition.

Shaleka Alula EngedaÕs military abilities at the battles of GundetGudagude and Gura had impressed Emperor Yohannes IV, who appointed him Ras and governor of Mereb Melash. [Nega is his horseÕs name hence he is also called Ras alula Aba Nega.  He also likes to sign as Ras Alula Turk Pasha, though he was never an officer of Turks.]

 

By 1887, Italians had established a fort in Saati, 26 kilometers inland from Massawa, a port they occupied since 1885.  Alula descended from the highlands and camped on the north side when Italians came out of the fort and engaged him on January 25, 1887. Italians retreated to their fort, and Alula bypassed the fort and moved to Dogali, 7 kilometers away from the fort Saati and 19 kilometers from Massawa. The commander of fort Saati had asked Massawa for reinforcement, and that reinforcement group of 540 Europeans, 50 Ethiopians, all fully armed and pulling 10 cannons was attacked in Dogali on the night of January 26, 1887. Of those 418 soldiers died the rest were wounded and died en route to Massawa, while others reached Massawa1.

 

Addendum C.

 

EthiopiaÕs internal animosities or wars were based on real and imagined causes, and paid little attention that such conditions would be exploited by Europeans to the advantage of Europeans and the disadvantage of Ethiopia. Worse, some Ethiopian notables worked directly for Italians and against Ethiopia's interests.  However, enough Ethiopians worked in unison under perhaps the cleverest Ethiopian leader, Menelik II, whose name will live in glory.

To say that Menelik II went to war only because of a disagreement of article 17 of the 2 May 1889 Treaty of Wuchale is to simplify a complex historical condition. To show the details of the complexities would take too much space.  At any rate, after Ethiopia decimated the Italian forces at Adwa in March 2, 1896, the Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed on October 1896, clearly states that the Wuchale treaty is erased in its entirety.  The 1896 Treaty not only negates previous treaties with Italy it is also the root treaty for subsequent conventions between Ethiopia and Italy. [Thus, when Ethiopia succeeds in having a true Ethiopia government, the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea will be found to have no legal foundation. Of course all treaties from 1896-1936 were violated and made irrelevant by Italy when it invaded Ethiopia9.].  At any rate, this addendum relates the Amba Alega and the Mekele military incidents of MenelikÕs forces as Ethiopia marched to Adwa.

 

C1. The December 8,1895 Battle of Amba Alage.

A forward unit of Italian invading forces had established a fort atop a hill, called Amba Alage, 74 kilometers south of Mekele. The relief of the hill is 3013 meters, and it overlooked a narrow path to Mekele.  The commanding Italian, Major Tosseli, and his Ethiopian helpers had 2350 soldiers of which 1350 were Europeans.  He had 4 cannons. An Ethiopian advance force, commanded by Ras Mekonen, had arrived in the region and encamped in the vicinity, when Fitawrari Gebeyahu started firing and climbing the hill. He said that he did not wish the Italians to menace Emperor Menilik II when he would arrive. Shortly thereafter, the Ethiopian generals joined the battle, Ras Wole on the right, Ras Mekonen and Ras Mikael in the middle, Ras Mengesha and Ras Alula from the back2.

 

The battle was fought and won on hdar 28, 1888 (December 8, 1895)2.  From the Italian side 2000 were killed. From the Ethiopian side 276 died and the wounded numbered 349.

 

C2. Dislodge Italians from a fort at Mekale in late January 1986: Empress TayetuÕ strategy.

Mekele is 74 kilometers from Adigrat and 180 kilometers from Adwa by current roads.  The Italian fort was on a high ground of 178 meters relief where the Anda Selassie Church was built.  The Italian Major Galeo, commanding 97 European and 1150 askaris (Italian–serving Ethiopians) stayed in the fort.  When MenelikÕs division arrived, the fort was surrounded at safe distances, with MenelikÕs camp being 6.5 kilometers away for the fort2.

 

Italian cannons and fire power deterred Ethiopians who attempted to lay siege to the fort. The strategy that disallowed drinking water helped in dislodging Italian forces from the fort. There were three water holes with the one on the south of the fort being the closest, about 400 meters  (some say 150 ÒkndÓ) from the fort.  After getting satisfied that Ethiopians cannons fired farther (4.5 km) than Italian cannons (3.85 km), and that the nearest water hole from the Italian fort could be protected by Ethiopian cannons and soldiers that would be placed at the water holes, Empress Tayetu decided to implement her interesting strategy. She secured permission from Menelik II and sent Ethiopian soldiers to guard the water hole and to disallow the Italian forces at the fort from getting drinking water. Three hundred armed Ethiopians went to the water hole on Thursday at 9:00 PM, under the cover of darkness and the protection of Ethiopian cannons, and established foxholes. The next morning Ethiopian cannons fired at Italian cannons, and the Italians had to move their cannons to safer distances2.  The Italians were forced to ration the water they had.  Within 10 days by Ter 21 (January 30, 1896) Menelik permitted them to get out of the fort unharmed.  What Menelik II wished was to resolve the problem with Italy peacefully.  The Italian forces purchased mules, etc., and on 23rd (February 2, 1896) started their journey to join their friends at Adigrat2.  Their ultimate fate shall be determined at the March 1-2, 1896 battle of Adwa where thousands of Italian forces were killed, wounded, taken prisoner or otherwise fled the battle, and the Italian government signed the 26 October 1896 Peace Treaty at Addis Abeba.

 

The Mekele fort military incident shows the superior strategy of an Ethiopian woman, Empress Tayetu, compared to Italian forces at the fort of Mekele of 1896.   It is perhaps the greatest example of contributions of women in human wars and ought to be taught at enlightened Òwomen studiesÓ courses offered across the world.

 

 

Brief cultural and political aspects in Ethiopia of 100-150 years ago.

We should not be deceived by current Ethiopian conditions or by what some daydreams tell us of what would happen in the future.  We need to know our past very carefully before we continue to incriminate each other for what was done, might have been done or ought to have been done, or was not done.  Some aspects of ancient Ethiopian practices cultures and lack of centralized government should be looked at more carefully than ever before so that we may understand our forebears about 100-150 years ago. Knowing the past might permit us not to repeat the same mistakes.

 

1. The practice of Ethiopian princes of not paying attention to the citizenships of governors who pay them tributes might have been exploited by Istanbul. Individuals subservient to the Ottoman Empire may have been port governors, naibes, who also paid tributes to Ethiopian princes.  The Ottomans gave 9000 musketeers from Yemen to support the Jihad by Ahmed Gragn (1529-1543) against Christians, and a Turkish ship arrived near Massawa in 1557. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire might have believed that it was a protector of Muslims. For whatever reason Istanbul had the bogus and irrational claim over Ethiopia.  This bogus claim was used by Britain and the Khedive of Egypt to advance its insatiable desire to colonize peoples and regions and thereby weaken Ethiopia.

 

2. Port governors paid tributes to highland rulers, and if they donÕt a large army would be sent to make them pay tributes.  However, highland rulers or their armies could not stay longer in coastal lowlands because of insufficient water and food for their soldiers and animals, and also for fear of diseases such as malaria.  Yet, these meant Ethiopia did not develop its ports or build warships since the fall of the Aksumite kingdom.  It further meant Ethiopian coastal territories and islands were not well protected.

 

3. The failure of Ethiopian government to build amenities for their citizens had contributed to the weakening of a sense of citizenship.  This condition likely contributed to the false hope that some Ethiopians would have had based upon what European missionaries, European government consuls and alien residents preached to the people - as though alien governments would fulfill the peopleÕs needs.


4. When princes sought tribute they furnished no services to the people who paid tributes other than perhaps protecting them from attack by other lords.  First of all the living standard of the people remained very poor, so that aliens sought that they were superior to Ethiopians.  Secondly, the inhabitants could be easily persuaded to oppose the central Ethiopian authority.

5   The conditions of poverty were worse in the south.  Reports by ancient travellers indicate that people who were half naked or totally so inhabited large sections of the warmer region in the south. Aliens would treat such Ethiopians, as though they were less human.


6. Merchants and traders helped exchange items between individuals of the same or different regions. Worse some alien Muslims were engaged in trading humans as though they were goods.

 

7. Individuals may be soldiers or work on field or perform tasks assigned by the king, prince or lord as a means of gaining protection from being snatched by another individual or group.

 

8. Projects of the king, prince, governor or lord are performed in one of three ways a) pay in coinage, b) pay in kind (offer cattle, grains and processed food), and c) pay in services (i.e., send their people to work in the quarry for a given number of days, weeks or months-corvee labor). Most likely they provided combinations of the above.


9.  Powerful princes ruled Ethiopia during the ÒEra of princes,Ó and central government was weak to non-existent.  Before the Jihad against Christianity in Ethiopia led by Ahmed Gragn, Emperor Libne Dingl (1507-1540) had instructed the governor of Bale to collect taxes from Harer.  After the Jihad by Ahmed Gragn Emperor Zerse Dingl (1563-1597) had marched to Harer to establish his suzerainty.  Yet during the ÒEra of PrincesÓ several of the southern Ethiopia regions were decoupled from central administration by an emperor, as did those in northern Ethiopia.  Yohannes IV, and Menelik II continued the centralization process, which was started by Tewodros. Menelik II incorporated several southern regions and established a more organized central government.  Unfortunately, when the Egyptian expedition sailed to Zeyla and then marched to Harer, Emperor Menelik II had not re-incorporated Hararghe to Ethiopia.

 

10. Ethiopians appear to enter in a social contract with leviathans, many of the leviathans having been benevolent emperors.  However, when the leviathan is bad Ethiopians fare very badly.  Ethiopians should learn to have a social contract among each other but not with a leviathan. They should enter into a social contract among each other by surrendering a little of their natural rights so that they would establish a democratic society with three co-equal branches of government comprising of the legislator, the executive, and judiciary8.


References  (continued)

 

8.  Habte Giorgis Churnet. Replacing Language-based-group Politics by the EPLF/TPLF. USA. 2008

 

9.  http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/Negussay_NaturalSeaShores.htm. On EthiopiaÕs Legitimate Claim To Its Natural Seashores. Presented by Professor Negussay Ayela. 2000.